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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Mr.

now 59, is in his 41st year of incarceration for a 32 years to life sentence that he

received for his actions on August 2, 1979, when he was an 18-year-old with no prior record.
The New York State Board of Parole (“Board”) denied Mr.

parole for the fifth time

in March 2019, following denials in 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. The Board commended Mr.
on his personal growth, programmatic achievements, and productive use of time and stated
that his institutional adjustment had been good since 1989. The Board also deemed his disciplinary
history to be good, his case plan goals appropriately focused, and noted Mr.
all required programming and his engagement in volunteer programing.
acknowledged that Mr.

completion of
The Board also

had strong support from family members, friends, and from

supervisory DOCCS staff and recognized that Mr.

COMPAS risk assessment indicated low

risk in every single category. Finally, the Board commended Mr.

for his remorse for his

crimes and the work he has done to understand the consequences of his actions. Nonetheless, two
of the three commissioners denied parole based on Mr.

crimes, “opposition” from the

District Attorney, and “community opposition.” Ex. 1 at 38-40; Ex. 16, Mr.

Parole

Submission; Ex. 17 Support Letters from Family and Friends; Ex. 18 March, 2019

Letter;

Ex. 19 DOCCS Work History.
The Board’s denial decision violated the Board’s statutory and regulatory requirements in
the following ways:
First, the Board did not explain its departure from all twelve COMPAS categories, nor did
it provide individualized reasons for its departure from each of those scales, in contravention of its
recently revised regulations and numerous Supreme Court decisions interpreting those regulations.
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Second, the Board did not address how it considered the parole factors set forth in the
Executive Law—as it is required to do under its own regulations—and instead ignored Mr.
decades of varied and successful rehabilitative efforts.
Third, the Board did not explain the reason for its denial in detail, flouting the Executive
Law requirement that it do so.
Fourth, the “community opposition” that the Board relied on conveyed penal philosophy
based on erroneous information—that Mr.

was convicted of two murders, that he remains a

danger to society—and contained offensive and highly inflammatory rhetoric. The vast majority
of the opposition came from and impermissibly reflected the penal philosophy of a single
organization, the New York City Police Benevolent Association, a police union that automatically
opposes release for any crime that results in the death of a police officer. This kind of “community
opposition” is not a factor the Board may validly consider.
Fifth, the Board relied on erroneous information. The Board claimed that the Brooklyn
District Attorney opposed Mr.
not submit a statement opposing Mr.

release. But Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez did
release.

Sixth, the Board failed to request a recommendation from the current Brooklyn District
Attorney, and instead relied on opposition from the administration of Charles Hynes—who lost
reelection in 2013. That stale letter did not reflect the views of the District Attorney who has since
been chosen by Mr.

community to enforce the law and make parole recommendations.

Seventh, the Board failed to identify an aggravating factor that justified denying Mr.
parole for a fifth time, denials that have imposed nearly an additional decade of incarceration for
a crime

committed as an 18-year-old adolescent with no prior criminal record.
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Eighth, the Board violated Mr.
on an unproven assertion that Mr.

Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury by relying
intentionally killed Officer

Additionally, the Board’s repeated denials of parole have failed to give Mr.

to evade arrest.
an adolescent

offender, a constitutionally meaningful opportunity for parole.
Each error warrants annulment of the Board’s March 2019 parole denial.
VENUE
This action is properly commenced in Dutchess County because it is the county where the
Board conducted the parole interview and made the decision to deny parole. An Article 78 petition
may be filed in “any county within the judicial district where the respondent made the
determination complained of.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 506(b) and § 7804(b); see also International
Summit Equities Corp. vs. Van Schoor, 560 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812 (2d Dep’t 1990) (noting that venue
is preferable in the specific county “in which the matter sought to be reviewed originated”). The
Parole Board conducted the March 20, 2019 interview in Fishkill, New York. See Ex. 1, at 1.
Thus, this action is properly commenced in Dutchess County.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner

was denied parole on March 20, 2019, after an interview conducted

at Fishkill Correctional Facility on the same day. See Ex. 1. Commissioners Davis and Berliner
denied parole; Commissioner Shapiro dissented. Mr.

filed a timely notice of administrative

appeal on April 2, 2019 and subsequently perfected the appeal on July 31, 2019. See Ex. 8
Administrative Appeal Decision at 1. The Board’s Appeals Unit belatedly affirmed the Board’s
denial of parole on January 16, 2020. Id. Accordingly, Mr.

has exhausted his administrative

remedies and this matter is ripe for the instant Article 78 proceeding. Additionally, Mr.
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petition is properly filed within the applicable four-month statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 217(1).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In late June of 1979, Mr.

bought an unlawful revolver after being robbed and beaten

up multiple times. Ex. 1 at 30; Ex. 14, January 25, 1982 Sentencing Transcript Excerpts at 22. On
August 2, the rain was slowing as Mr.

got off the subway, returning to Brooklyn from taking

a civil service exam in Manhattan. Ex. 1 at 9. As Mr.

walked home, he and several other

pedestrians took a neighborhood shortcut through a field where a softball game was about to
resume. The softball game was between a neighborhood team and off-duty officers from the local
precinct. Since the rain had stopped and play had not yet resumed, the umpire, a local priest,
waved Mr.

and the other pedestrians through. Id. at 10. Softball players, many unaware of

the priest’s invitation, were returning to the field as the pedestrians walked through it, and an
argument between the two groups began.
In the ensuing physical altercation, Mr.

fired a single shot that killed Mr.

He then fled. He was chased by a group of players that included at least one off-duty
police officer; Mr.

shot the gun several times as he ran. Id. 4-5. After several blocks, off-

duty Police Officer

caught up and tackled Mr.

knocking him face first into

the ground, breaking his teeth. Id. at 5. While they tussled on the ground over the gun, Mr.
pulled the trigger once, shooting Officer
Mr.

in the stomach. Id. at 6.

was apprehended right away, when the rest of the off-duty officers and civilian

players arrived. He was hit on the head several times, with one blow rendering him
unconscious. Id. When Mr.

awoke at the hospital, he learned he had been shot three times

4

FUSL000019

in the front of his legs, his arm was broken, his skull was fractured, his arm and hand had knife
wounds, and he had a ruptured spleen. Id. at 7:7-9 and 17:12-20; Ex. 14 at 24.
Trials and Sentences
Mr.

first trial ended in a mistrial when the presiding judge became ill. At the second

trial, the jury deadlocked on the two murder charges as to Mr.
convicted Mr.

but

of second degree criminal possession of a weapon and first degree reckless

endangerment. At the third trial, Mr.
Mr.

and Officer

was convicted of second degree murder for the death of

and first degree manslaughter for the death of Officer
Mr.

was sentenced to 2 to 6 years for each of the weapon and endangerment

convictions, to run concurrently. Mr.
of Officer

was later sentenced to 7 to 21 years for the manslaughter

and 25 years to life for the murder of Mr.

to run consecutively, but

concurrently with the 2 to 6 year sentences. By operation of law, the manslaughter and murder
sentences merged into a combined sentence of 32 years to life. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(1)(b).
Parole History
Mr.

became eligible for parole in 2011. The Board denied him at his initial

appearance in March 2011 and subsequently denied him at his reappearances in March 2013,
March 2015, March 2017, and March 2019.
Following the Board’s fifth denial, Mr.

submitted a notice of appeal on April 2, 2019

and, on May 1, a request pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5 for all materials on which the Board
relied in making its determination. The Board subsequently produced certain materials and
represented that the only item withheld was the pre-sentence report. See Ex. 9, email from S.
Koolen, DOCCS Office of Counsel. Mr.

timely perfected the appeal on July 31, 2019. See

Ex. 8. Respondents subsequently failed to issue a decision within 120 days, as required by the
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regulations.

See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8006.4(c). Several weeks after the Board failed to issue a

decision, the Board notified counsel for Mr.

that it had failed to disclose an unspecified

number of additional records on which the commissioners had relied. Ex. 20, December 16, 2019
DOCCS Counsel’s letter and subsequent email thread. After several more weeks, the Board
produced two categories of previously undisclosed materials and advised counsel that additional
categories of undisclosed materials existed, but would not be disclosed. Ex. 21, January 6, 2020
letter from J. Baumann, SORC, and subsequent email thread. More than five months after
receiving the perfected appeal—but within hours of correspondence from Mr.

counsel

regarding the Board’s failure to properly disclose the parole file materials—the Appeals Unit
issued a decision denying the appeal. See Ex. 21 at 3, January 15, 2020 email and Ex. 8, January
16, 2020 Administrative Appeal Decision.
COMPAS Risk Assessment
Mr.

most recent COMPAS assessment was completed in 2017 and reused by

DOCCS for the 2019 parole interview. The assessment reports that Mr.

is the lowest possible

risk in all twelve categories—“1” out of “10”—and DOCCS recommends that he receive the
lowest level of parole supervision upon release. Ex. 15, COMPAS.
Disciplinary History
Mr.

has received a total of six tickets in more than forty years and only one in the past

two decades. Two of his six tickets (received in 1999 and 2009) are Tier IIIs. Neither involve
drugs or violence. Ex. 10, Disciplinary History.
Thirty years ago, Mr.

pleaded guilty to assaulting another incarcerated man who made

unwanted sexual advances. This offense did not result in a disciplinary ticket and is therefore not
reflected on the attached disciplinary history; however, it did result in a misdemeanor conviction
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for third degree assault. Mr.

guilty plea demonstrates his acceptance of responsibility and

the personal statement he submitted to the Board articulates the lessons he learned from his
conduct. Ex. 16 at 2, Personal Statement.
Remorse and Acceptance of Responsibility
For decades, Mr.

has thought deeply and with difficultly about what he did in 1979.

His written and oral statements to the Board over the years illustrate his reflection. In Mr.
2017 written submission (which the Board again considered as part of his parole file in 2019), he
describes how his “short-sighted belief” and “morally deficient mindset” led him to think he
needed an illegal gun for his protection, but actually made him the “victimizer” of others. Mr.
writes that:
Each day, and on sleepless nights, I dwell on the ripple of loss that my past actions
are causing now. Not only have I taken the life of Mr.
an
innocent, aspiring member of society, I am also responsible for the death of Police
Officer
taking one of New York’s Heroes. . . . Each day I am truly
ashamed and disgusted at myself for my ignorant, self-centered, irrational behavior,
and my lack of respect for, and failure to acknowledge the rights of others. I have
caused two families a level of anguish and emotional pain that no family should
ever be subject to. Resorting to violence as a reflexive action showed emotional
immaturity, moral weakness and especially, a failure to understand the
consequences and finality of my actions. . . I apologize to the family of Police
Officer
and the family of Mr.
for the pain and
loss I have brought into their lives.
Ex. 16, Personal Statement (emphasis in original).
Rehabilitation and Programmatic History
Mr.
meaningful. Mr.

programmatic history has been—and continues to be—extensive and
completed all mandatory programs, and pursued higher-level, voluntary

opportunities. The following is a selected list of the many programs that Mr.
•

Lifers and Long Termers Organization (2000-Present)
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o Volunteer organization run by and for fellow incarcerated men serving long-term
sentences that provides services, support, and events to promote reflection and
remorse.
•

Osborne Association’s Long Termers Responsibility Project: “Coming to Terms” (2018)
o This project highlighted concepts of self-insight, responsibility, the experience of
victims of crime, remorse, and apology by having victims of violent crimes met
with incarcerated men.

•

Road to Redemption: Victim Awareness Program (2014)
o A twelve-week program where participants take responsibility for the impact of
their crimes on others and identify the many victims ultimately affected by their
actions.

•

Thinking for Change Program (2011)
o This program incorporated research from cognitive restructuring theory, social
skills development, and the learning and use of problem-solving skills.

•

Puppies Behind Bars (2007-2012)
o Mr.
was one of 150 incarcerated persons across 7 prisons to participate in this
program, which prepares service dogs for use by wounded veterans, first
responders, and law enforcement. Each human participant is carefully screened by
the staff of the correctional facility and Puppies Behind Bars personnel. In order to
qualify, the individual has to have a satisfactory disciplinary record and must be
considered reliable and trustworthy by prison officials.
o In addition to completing an eighteen-month animal caretaker training and
certificate, Mr.
trained, cared for, and prepared three service dogs for
placement.

•

Aggression Replacement Training (2007)
o This program provided group training sessions targeting social skills, anger control,
and moral reasoning.

•

Alternatives to Violence Project Basic (1994)
o A Lifers and Long Termers program that teaches conflict management and
resolution skills.

•

Alternatives to Violence Project Advanced (1999)
o Continuation of the basic course that teaches people to lead non-violent lives
through affirmation, respect for all, and cooperation.

•

Legal Research Certification (1990)

•

Commercial Art Teacher’s Aide (1984-1989, 1993-1995) and Certification (1994)
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•

Corrections on Canvas Art Shows (1984-1993)
o Mr.
submitted artwork for the annual exhibition and art sale where proceeds
go to the New York Crime Victims Board, which provides financial and other
assistance to victims of crime throughout the State.

•

Chaplin’s Clerk (1989-1993)

Employment History
For twenty years, first at Greenhaven Correctional Facility and now at Fishkill Correctional
Facility, Mr.

has worked for

Industries. When Mr.

arrived at Fishkill, his former

supervisor from Greenhaven quickly sought him out and recruited him to be the lead clerk for
manufacturing and production inventory control for
diligence and care with which Mr.
During his years with

a reflection of the

approaches work. Ex. 18; Ex. 19.
Mr.

has served as a welder, porter, and clerk. He is

currently an “Industry Worker V,” the highest supervisory level available for an incarcerated
person. In this role, Mr.

is responsible for ensuring that each of the five shops on the one

hundred person assembly line have the materials they need—at the time they need them—to
produce a variety of steel goods, including desks, tables, chairs, and custom fabrications for use
throughout New York State. He directly manages dozens of other incarcerated men, instructs the
leadsmen, acts as liaison between the civilian supervisors and the incarcerated workers, oversees
shipping and receiving, and conducts quality inspection. Ex. 19.
Employability and Work Recommendations
Reflecting his competence and his supervisors’ trust in him, Mr.

is praised by DOCCS

personnel in nine letters of recommendation. Ex. 18. Correctional supervisors consistently
describe Mr.
•

as professional, responsible and an asset to

2019
o Sergeant

Industries:

(Industry Sergeant, Fishkill C.F.)
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•

2017
o Mr.


o Mr.


o Mr.

•

2015
o Mr.


•

2013
o Mr.


o Mr.


o Mr.


•

2011
o Mr.

“Mr.
always displays professionalism, self-control, and is respectful as
he works well with Civilian staff, Security staff, and his inmate
peers…Inmate
is an asset to
Industry and has always
respected Security working in Industry.”

(Industrial Superintendent, Fishkill C.F.)
“His diverse abilities, ranging from blue print interpretation, material
takeoff, inventory management and material knowledge are essential in
helping train new inmate employees in production procedures.”
(Quality Control Supervisor, Fishkill C.F.)
“He consistently displays a work ethic that is above the average worker, to
the extent that he is the lead man for all clerks, responsible for everything
relating to production.”
(General Industrial Training Supervisor, Fishkill C.F.)
“He has a strong and consistent work ethic and is always willing to help
others…Any employer will be pleased to have him as a worker.”

(Industrial Training Supervisor, Fishkill C.F.)
“He has met and exceeded our expectations in his performance. He has
displayed an extremely strong work ethic, coupled with an excellent attitude
and demeanor with both staff and peers alike.”

(Industrial Superintendent, Fishkill C.F.)
“His capacity as a grade five inmate supervisor has set a high work standard
for all other industry inmate employees to strive for here at Fishkill.”
(Quality Control Supervisor, Fishkill C.F.)
“He remains a dedicated, hardworking, respectful member of Fishkill
…Again I have to stress the fact that Mr.
is a definite asset to
this program.”
(Industrial Superintendent, Fishkill C.F.)
“Along with his normal job duties, he is also a critical element of offender
training, which is one of the core values of
He is constantly
mentoring other offenders imparting his knowledge of Fishkill products and
manufacturing processes.”

(Quality Control Supervisor, Fishkill C.F.)
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When he interviewed for the position he now holds I remembered his face
and the fact that he was a motivated individual…I spoke to him and hired
him on the spot.”

Re-Entry Plans
Mr.

has comprehensive re-entry plans with strong family and community support,

including support letters from several veterans. Ex. 16. These plans and support have expanded
over the years and have repeatedly been submitted to the Board. In addition to his personal support
network, Mr.

has obtained multiple letters of reasonable assurance from re-entry providers,

including the Osborne Association, the Doe Fund, and Housing Works. Id.
Mr.

has maintained positive relationships with his maternal cousins and extended

family, as well as several friends who live in the Brooklyn community. His social support system
is prepared to provide financial and emotional support to Mr.

throughout his re-entry process,

a reality recognized by several of his COMPAS scores. Ex. 15.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Board Violated Its Regulatory And Statutory Requirements By Failing To
Explain Its Departure From The COMPAS Assessment
The Board’s conclusion that release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and

would undermine respect for the law directly conflicts with each scale of the COMPAS assessment
and the overall COMPAS assessment. The COMPAS evaluation determined that Mr.

was at

the lowest risk of—for instance—committing a violent felony, being arrested, absconding from
parole supervision, and abusing substances. Therefore, the Board had a duty to explain why the
release of a person who does not pose a danger to the public would be incompatible with society’s
welfare. Similarly, the Board had a duty to explain how the release of such a person after more
than 40 years in prison would communicate that the crime was not serious and that the law had not
taken the crime seriously.

11

FUSL000019

The Board also departed from COMPAS when despite an evaluation that concluded Mr.
would have family and financial support and solid employment options upon release, the
Board still determined that release would clash with the welfare of society and undermine the law.
A.

The Board departed from every COMPAS scale without any explanation

Although Mr.

received the lowest risk score possible on each of the twelve COMPAS

risk categories, the Board still concluded that his release would be incompatible with the welfare
of society and would undermine respect for the law. The Board’s own regulations are quite clear
that if, in denying release, “the Board departs from the Department Risk and Needs Assessment’s
scores, the Board shall specify any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from
which it departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 8002.2(a). Because the Board’s conclusion departed from each COMPAS scale, the Board had
a duty to explain, but failed to do so.
Mr.

2017 COMPAS assessment concluded that he presented the lowest possible

risk—“1” out of “10”—in all twelve categories, including risk of felony violence, arrest risk, and
abscond risk. The assessment recommended that upon release he receive supervision status 4—
the lowest possible level of parole supervision—a strong indication that Mr.

presents minimal

risk and is ready to be reintegrated into society. Ex. 15 at 1-2.
Despite the Board’s recognition that Mr.

COMPAS was “low risk in every

category,” during the interview, the Board failed to explain how it made the decision that Mr.
release would be “incompatible with the welfare of society.” Ex. 1 at 23:4-5 and 39:12-13.
Under its regulations, the Board must specify each scale within the risk assessment from which it
departed. Here, Mr.

received the best possible score on every single scale. Yet the Board’s

decision provided absolutely no explanation for its departure from any scale, let alone all of them.
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In case after case, Board decisions that depart from COMPAS without explanation have
been reversed:
•

Robinson v. Stanford, No. 2392/2018, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019)
(ordering de novo interview for man with two murder convictions and low COMPAS
scores because “the Parole Board’s finding that discretionary release would not be
compatible with the welfare of society directly contradicts these scores in his COMPAS
assessment. As the Board’s determination denying release departed from these risks and
needs assessment scores, pursuant to 9 NYCRR § 8002.2 it was required to articulate with
specificity the particular scale in any needs and assessment from which it was departing
and provide an individualized reason for such departure. The Board’s conclusory
statement that it considered statutory factors, including petitioner’s risk to the community,
rehabilitation efforts and needs for successful community re-entry in finding that
discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare of society fails to meet this
standard. As such, its determination denying parole release was affected by an error of
law.”) (emphasis added);

•

Comfort v. New York State Bd. of Parole, No. 1445/2018, at *5 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty.
Dec. 21, 2018) (ordering de novo interview for man incarcerated for murdering an
undercover police officer because “Petitioner's COMPAS instrument clearly identifies
Petitioner as the lowest possible risk (1) in the following three categories – risk of felony
violence, arrest risk and abscond risk. Although Respondent's counsel baldly claims that
the decision was not a departure from COMPAS, it is difficult to reconcile how the parole
board's finding that Petitioner was likely to reoffend is not a departure from the COMPAS
assessment rating Petitioner at the lowest possible risk for reoffending. Accordingly, the
parole board's finding that it was likely that Petitioner would reoffend is a departure from
the COMPAS instrument. With such a departure 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a) requires
Respondent to specify the scale from which it departed and provide an individualized
reason for such departure.”) (emphasis added);

•

Diaz v. Stanford, No. 53088/2017, at *8 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Apr. 4, 2018) (ordering
de novo interview for man incarcerated for killing an assistant district attorney because
“[w]hile a low COMPAS score does not entitle an inmate to parole release, the Board did
not discuss why it completely discounted Mr. Diaz’s COMPAS scores and concluded that
there is a reasonable probability that he would not “live at liberty without violating the
law”. The Court cannot glean from the cursory nature of its decision how it utilized its
own risk assessment procedures in concluding that petitioner’s release is incompatible with
the welfare of society at this time.”);

•

Matter of Coleman v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 157 A.D.3d
672, 673 (2d Dep’t 2018) (reversing denial of Art. 78 petition because “the petitioner . . .
was assessed “low” for all risk factors on his COMPAS (Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) risk assessment. Thus, a review of the
record demonstrates that in light of all of the factors, notwithstanding the seriousness of
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the underlying offense, the Parole Board's ‘determination to deny the petitioner release on
parole evinced irrationality bordering on impropriety.’”);
•

Ruzas v. New York State Board of Parole, No. 1456/2016, slip op. at 4 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess
Cty. Oct. 18, 2017) (holding the Board in contempt for conducting defective de novo
interview after the Court set aside the initial decision because “the Board summarily denied
[petitioner’s] application without any explanation other than by reiterating the laundry list
of statutory factors. The minimal attention, barely lip service, given to these factors and to
the COMPAS Assessment cannot be justified given the amount of time already served.”);

•

Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 28-29 (1st Dep’t 2016)
(characterizing as “unsupported” the Board’s assertions contradicting petitioner’s
COMPAS score, and affirming granting of de novo interview);

•

Matter of Rabenbauer v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 2014 N.Y.
Slip Op. 24347, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. Nov. 12, 2014) (ordering de novo interview
because “the Parole Board ignored the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for
Alterative Sanction risk assessment and made only superficial inquiry into the statutory
factors in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).”); and

•

Stokes v. Stanford, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 50899(U), at *2 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. June 9, 2014)
(granting de novo interview after noting that petitioner’s “COMPAS report found him at
low risks in all categories it considered. . . . Although the determination parrots the
applicable statutory language, the Board does not even attempt to explain the disconnect
between its conclusion and petitioner’s rehabilitation efforts and his low risk scores.”).

•

Phillips v. Stanford, 52579/19 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty, 2019 (J. Rosa) (holding that the
Board did not explain departure from low COMPAS scores).
Mr.

case is analogous to the cases cited above. The Board failed to explain how it

reached the conclusion that Mr.

release was incompatible with the welfare of society if (1)

his “COMPAS risk assessment indicate[d] low risk in every category;” (2) he has had no
disciplinary infractions since 2009; and (3) his “institutional adjustment has been good since”
1989. Ex. 1 at 19:21-23; 38:21-24. Without such an explanation, the decision must be reversed.
B.

The Board failed to meaningfully consider the COMPAS Assessment

The Board’s acknowledgement that it was departing from the COMPAS and its citation to
Mr.

conduct over 40 years ago to justify its departure displays a fundamental

misunderstanding of the Board’s obligation to consider the COMPAS assessment. The Board’s
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decision states that “[t]he majority of the panel departs from the COMPAS due to the tragic
reckless nature of the crimes themselves . . .”.

Ex. 1 at 39:9-11. By “departing” from the

COMPAS scores in this manner, the Board determined that no matter the COMPAS scores, the
crimes outweighed them. But the purpose of COMPAS is not to “excuse” a person’s crime—it is
to determine whether the person who committed a crime decades ago still presents the same risks
to society today.
COMPAS was implemented to provide greater objectivity, consistency, and transparency
in the Board’s decision making. Under the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, the Board
had to “establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation
of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and
assist members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole
supervision.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259(c)(4). The Board adopted the COMPAS Risk and Needs
Assessment tool in order to comply with its statutory mandate. According to DOCCS, COMPAS
is an empirically validated “research based clinical assessment instrument” used to assess an
incarcerated person’s risks and needs by “gathering quality and consistent information to support
decisions about supervision, treatment, and other interventions.”1
COMPAS is not—and has never been—a mitigating factor for a person’s crime. The tool
has “criminal history” and “disciplinary history” sections to consider the person’s prior acts, and
the “history of violence” scale incorporate a person’s criminal history. See Ex. 15 at 1-3. But
COMPAS scores do not excuse a crime, nor are they meant to. COMPAS is a forward-looking
risk assessment, not a backward-looking value judgment. COMPAS is meant to help the Board

1

DOCCS,
Directive
No.
8500:
http://www.doccs ny.gov/Directives/8500.pdf.

COMPAS
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assess a person’s risk if they are released, not the sufficiency of their sentence for the crime they
committed decades ago. The Board disregarded Mr.

demonstrably low risk and clear

rehabilitation because it deemed his decades of incarceration insufficient for his crimes. See, e.g.,
Ely v. Bd of Parole, 2016/100407 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2017) (“Petitioner's COMPAS Assessment,
lack of a prior criminal record, age, infirmity, lengthy imprisonment to date, clear expression of
remorse, acceptance of responsibility for her crime, post-release plans, the many letters submitted
by corrections professionals in support of her release, and the many positive initiatives she
undertook during her incarceration, indicate . . . that no amount of evidence of rehabilitation would
have outweighed [Respondent’s] interest in retribution.”). Mr.

COMPAS assessment

indicates that he has the lowest possible risk as he re-enters society today. The Board’s decision
to disregard that assessment on the basis of Mr.

actions more than 40 years ago is irrational

and was made without explanation.
II.

The Board Violated The Regulations By Not Explaining How It Considered All The
Parole Decision Making Factors
When denying release, the Board must provide the “factors and reasons for such denial of

parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
259-i(a)(2). When rendering its decision denying parole, the Board failed to explain how it
considered the applicable parole factors. The regulations require that the Board, “in factually
individualized and non-conclusory terms, address how the applicable parole decision-making
principles and factors listed in 8002.2 were considered.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). The Board
loosely referenced certain factors but did not apply them to Mr.

individual facts. Instead,

the Board devoted the majority of its decision to discussing the offenses.

16

FUSL000019

A.

The Board’s decision and interview impermissibly relied on the seriousness of
the offense

Here, the Board relied on a single statutory factor—the seriousness of the offenses—to
justify its decision denying parole. While the decision purported to rely on opposition from the
Brooklyn district attorney and “community opposition,” those materials were similarly based on
the seriousness of the offense. See infra Argument IV and V. The Board’s only reason for denial
was thus the seriousness of the offenses. The Board cannot deny parole based solely on the nature
of the offense. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Evans, 987 118 A.D.3d 707, 707 (2d Dep’t 2014) (granting
de novo interview because “it is clear that the Board denied release solely on the basis of the
seriousness of the offense”) (citations omitted); Perfetto v. Evans, 112 A.D.3d 640, 641 (2d Dep’t
2013) (affirming granting of de novo interview where the Board “mentioned the petitioner’s
institutional record, [but] it is clear that the Parole Board denied the petitioner’s request to be
released on parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense”) (citations omitted).
The vast majority of the parole interview was devoted to the crimes and trial—26 pages
out of 37. See Ex. 1 at 1-37. Much of the 2 1/2 page decision is similarly focused on the crime.
See Ex. 1 at 39-40. Focusing on the crime at the expense of the other factors is insufficient under
both the law and the Board’s own rules. See Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945, 947 (2d Dep’t
2010) (“Here, the Parole Board cited only the seriousness of the petitioner’s crime, and failed to
mention in its determination any of the other statutory factors. . . . Accordingly, the Parole Board’s
determination demonstrates that it failed to weigh the statutory factors, and a new parole hearing
is warranted.”); Mitchell v. New York State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742 (2d Dep’t 2009) (holding
that the Board cannot focus solely on the offense to the exclusion of other statutory factors and
affirming granting of de novo interview).
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Further, under its regulations, the Board must consider any “mitigating and aggravating
factors.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d)(7). But the Board did not consider that the adolescent Mr.
response in 1979—to the crowd of players on the softball field, to the crowd as they pursued
Mr.

and to Officer

when he tackled Mr.

was driven by fear: the fear of seeing

players hit other pedestrians on the field and the fear of what those players might do if they caught
him. That fear does not justify Mr.

actions, and Mr.

does not seek to use his fear as an

excuse for what he did. But his fear was not misplaced. When the crowd reached Mr.
suffered serious injuries. By the time Mr.

he

arrived at the hospital, he had a fractured skull,

three gunshot wounds to his legs, a broken arm, knife wounds to his hand and arm, and a ruptured
spleen. See Ex. 1 at 7:7-9 (“I did not understand how I got to the hospital, and I have three bullet
wounds in the fronts of my legs and my arm was cut and my hand was cut”); id. at 17:12-20 (“Q:
You said you had been shot a couple of times, right?” A: Twice in my left leg and once in my
right leg. Q: And there were some stab wounds? A: One in my upper arm, and the webbing of
my hand between my forefinger and thumb was sliced open. Q: And you have no idea how any
of that came to be? A: I don’t recall any of this happening.”); Ex. 14, January 25, 1982 Sentencing
Transcript Excerpts, at 24 (listing Mr.

injuries).

Additionally, the Board did not consider Mr.

age more than 40 years ago as a

mitigating factor to the seriousness of his offense. He was 18. While the Board did consider that
Mr.

was carrying an unlawful revolver, it did not consider that he was doing so because he

had previously been assaulted and robbed, and was once beaten so severely that his attackers left
him lying unconscious on the sidewalk. See Ex. 1 at 30:7-12 (“I’ve been robbed a couple of times
before that so I thought I needed [the gun] for my protection, but I didn’t realize that having it
made me dangerous, made everybody need to be protected from me, made me the victimizer of
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everyone else.”); Ex. 3 at 11:6-9 (describing being left unconscious during a robbery); Ex. 14 at
22 (describing assault during robberies).
Taken together, not only did the Board improperly focus primarily on Mr.
but it also failed to consider Mr.

crime,

significant injuries before his arrest, his immaturity at the

time of his offense, and his prior beatings as mitigating factors.
B.

The Board’s decision and interview ignored other required parole factors

The Board also failed to consider three other required factors. First, the Board is required
to consider post-release plans. See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002(d)(3) (requiring the Board to consider
“release plans including community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate.”). The interview does not demonstrate how the Board considered
Mr.

release plans, and the Board’s same-day decision also does not explain how it

considered his release plans. Mr.

has developed extensive re-entry plans. His parole file

contained numerous letters from family and friends—several of whom are military veterans—that
described how they would have supported him should he have been released. Mr.

obtained

three letters of reasonable assurance from employers in North Carolina, where members of his
family have lived for five generations. He also had letters of reasonable assurance from the
Osborne Association and the Redemption Center in New York. See Ex. 16.
Second, the Board is required to consider a parole candidate’s institutional record. See 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d)(1) (requiring the Board to consider “the institutional record, including
program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education training or
work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff and inmates.”). The Board did not consider
Mr.

extensive vocational history. He was an exemplary participant in

industry

program at Greenhaven Correctional Facility and in 2010, shortly after his arrival at Fishkill, was
recruited to be the lead clerk for manufacturing and production inventory control for
19
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Specialty Steel. In this role, Mr.

is responsible for ensuring that each of the five shops on the

one hundred person assembly line have the materials they need—at the time they need them—to
produce a variety of steel goods, including desks, tables, chairs, and custom fabrications for use
throughout New York state. As the lead clerks in each of the five shops have gone home over the
past decade, Mr.

supervisors have asked him to temporarily lead those shops until they are

able to hire a new lead clerk. Mr.

learned the operations of each shop during these periods of

expanded responsibilities, including teaching himself how to operate AutoCAD while in the shop
responsible for manufacturing chairs.
supervisors’ trust in him, Mr.

Ex. 1 at 20-21. Reflecting his competence and his

parole file contains numerous glowing assessments from his

DOCCS supervisors. Ex. 18.
Third, the Board is required to consider the candidate’s prior criminal history. See
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d)(8) (requiring the Board to consider “prior criminal record, including the
nature and pattern of the inmate’s offenses”). The interview and decision state that Mr.

had

“no prior criminal history.” Ex. 1 at 18:5-6, 22-23 and 38:19. But neither passing reference makes
clear how the Board considered the fact that Mr.
during the

despite growing up in

and

s—had no criminal record before his actions on August 2, 1979.

In addition to the three factors that the Board ignored, the remaining statutory factors, to
the extent the Board mentioned them, supported release:
•
•
•
•
•
•

“The Board of Parole commends your personal growth, programmatic
achievements and productive use of time” (Ex. 1 at 38:8-9);
“Your institutional adjustment has been good since [1989]” (id. at 38:22);
“Your last disciplinary violation was a Tier III in 2009” (id. at 38:23-24);
“Your case plan goals are appropriately focused” (id. at 38:25);
“You have satisfied the programs required of you by DOCCS” (id. at 39:1-2);
“You have also engaged in volunteer programs, including Puppies Behind Bars,
which is also to your credit” (id. at 39:2-4);
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•
•

“The panel makes note of your strong support, as evidenced by a number of letters
from family and friends as well as from supervisory staff at DOCCS” (id. at 39:2440:2); and
“You are also commended for your seemingly remorse for the victim of your crime
and their families and the work you have done over many years you have been
incarcerated to understand your actions and their affects [sic]” (id. at 40:3-7).

The decision establishes that the Board effectively ignored all statutory factors but one—
the seriousness of the offenses Mr.
III.

committed in 1979 as an 18-year-old.

The Board Violated the Executive Law By Failing To Explain The Reason For Denial
In Detail
A.

The Board did not explain how release after more than 40 years would
deprecate the seriousness of the crime or be incompatible with the welfare of
society

The Board concluded that “release would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime and
undermine respect for the law” and that “release at this time is incompatible with the welfare of
society,” but did not explain why. Ex. 1 at 40:12-14 and 38:12-13. Contrary to law, the Board did
not explain why release of a now 59-year-old man who has served more than 40 years in prison
for committing crimes when he was 18 years old would clash with society’s welfare and would
undermine respect for the law. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a) (“If parole is not granted upon
such review, the inmate shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of the
factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in
conclusory terms.”); see also 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b) (“Reasons for the denial of parole release
shall be given in detail.”).
The Board’s general description of Mr.

conduct more than four decades ago does

not explain how his release today will negatively impact society, nor how release today would
undermine respect for the law. Mr.

was sentenced pursuant to New York’s Penal Law and

the law permits parole. See also Cappiello v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2004 N.Y. Slip. Op.
51762(U), at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Nov. 30, 2004) (granting de novo interview and noting that
21
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“in a system which is premised on the hope and possibility of rehabilitation, and a statutory system
which mandates a serious, rational, and meaningful evaluation of the statutory criteria, we must
allow an individual who has taken advantage of opportunities to rehabilitate himself to move
beyond a horrific act of many years ago and to rejoin society to contribute according to his ability.
. . . [because] all the relevant facts were known to the sentencing judge at the time of sentencing.
They did not change from hearing to hearing. In fact, they will never change.”).
Moreover, the judges who imposed the aggregate sentence of 32 to life each chose not to
sentence Mr.

to the maximum minimum sentence; 32 years was deemed a sufficient

retributive sentence. After the first completed trial, at which the jury convicted Mr.

of second

degree criminal possession of a weapon and first degree reckless endangerment, and deadlocked
on the other charges, Mr.

was sentenced to 2 to 6 years for each conviction, to run

concurrently, despite the prosecution’s recommendation of 5 to 15 years on each conviction. See
Ex. 11, October 1, 1981 Sentencing Transcript Excerpts, at 11-12. The judge could have imposed
the sentences to run consecutively, instead of concurrently, for an effective sentence as long as 10
to 30 years, but instead imposed a far lower sentence of 2 to 6 years.
Similarly, the judge who sentenced Mr.

after his second completed trial that resulted

in a conviction for second degree murder and first degree manslaughter, could have run the
sentence imposed—32 years to life—consecutive to the 2 to 6 year sentences, but chose not to. In
addition, the judge imposed a sentence of 7 to 21 years for the manslaughter conviction, but could
have imposed a sentence as high as 8 1/3 to 25 years. Ex. 12, 1978 Laws of New York, at 2-3.
Had each judge imposed the maximum sentences, Mr.

would have been sentenced to

as many as 43 1/3 years to life. Instead, the ultimate sentencing judge determined that Mr.
should be considered for parole after 32 years, more than a decade sooner. In addition, neither
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judge recommended at sentence against Mr.

release after serving the minimum sentences

imposed. Further, neither judge subsequently submitted a letter recommending against release.
See Ex. 13, December 31, 2018 Parole Board Report (stating that there are no official statements
from the judges); see also Ex. 4, at 3-4 (requesting official statements from both judges).
Therefore, the Board’s determination that Mr.

release after more than 40 years of

imprisonment—8 years more than the minimum sentence—would undermine respect for the law
and convey a message that the crime was not serious is not supported by New York’s Penal Law
or the actual sentences imposed. In light of this, the Board had an obligation to explain its
conclusion.
B.

The Board did not explain its claims for denying parole

The Board made three claims in denying parole, but explained none in detail. Nor did the
Board explain in detail why such claims led the Board to conclude that release would undermine
society’s welfare and undermine respect for the law. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a) (requiring
that the Board’s reasons for denial “shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms.”); see also
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3 (b) (requiring that the Board’s reasons for denial “shall be given in detail.”).
First, the Board stated the crimes were a basis for denial. But the Board did not explain
why release after serving more than 8 years beyond the minimum for the crime against Mr.
was insufficient.
Second, the Board cited the opposition of the Brooklyn District Attorney, but did not state
the nature of that opposition, did not explain why the Board decided to follow the so-called
“opposition,” and did not explain why “opposition” originating eight years ago from a former
assistant Brooklyn district attorney was relevant to whether release at this time was appropriate.
Ex. 1 at 39:21-22.
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Third, the Board cited to “community opposition” but did not identify the source of the
“opposition,” the extent or nature of such “opposition,” or how this “opposition” established that
release would undermine respect for the law or conflict with society’s welfare as a whole. Ex. 1,
pg. 39:21-23.
Fourth, after commending Mr.

for his “personal growth” and his remorse and the work

he has done to understand his actions and their affects, the Board stated: “There is more to do, and
this panel encourages you to continue on this path as you continue your rehabilitation.” Ex. 1, pgs.
38:8-9; 40:3-9. This cryptic statement does not explain in detail a reason for denying parole. It is
unclear what the Board is conveying, but if the Board is suggesting Mr.

is not fully

rehabilitated, it is required to explain in detail. See supra Argument III.B. An ambiguous sentence
such as this does not suffice.
IV.

The Parole Board Violated The Statutory Requirements By Considering And Relying
Upon “Community Opposition” That Reflected Only A General Penal Philosophy
And Not The Circumstances In This Case
The Board considered and relied on “community opposition.” The Board initially provided

only one category of this “community opposition” to Mr.

approximately 21,000 identical

form letters that originated from the New York City Police Benevolent Association (“PBA”)
website. Ex. 5 at 1. In January 2020, the Board disclosed for the first time two additional
categories of “community opposition:” template letters and miscellaneous letters. Id. at 2These three categories—the PBA letters, template letters, and miscellaneous letters—all
contain the penal philosophy that anyone who takes the life of a police office should not be paroled.
Additionally, the template letters and the miscellaneous letters are based in large part on erroneous
information, namely, that Mr.

was convicted of murder as to Officer

and that Mr.

remains a danger to society. Finally, the miscellaneous letters contain rhetoric that cannot be
validly considered by the Board.
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A.

The Board Cannot Consider and Rely on the Penal Philosophy of Individuals

The vast majority of the “community opposition” in Mr.

parole file consisted of

approximately 21,000 PBA letters that were auto-generated from the organization’s website, which
holds and endorses the viewpoint that any person who kills a police officer should not be
released—ever.2 The PBA website enables any entity supplying any sort of name or zip code to
generate a letter that endorses the PBA’s philosophy that any person who kills a law enforcement
officer should never be paroled. Although the First and Third Departments have permitted
consideration of opposition from members of the public,3 all these form PBA letters considered
and relied on reflected general penal philosophy, which is not appropriate. See King v. New York
State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994) (“There is evidence in the record that petitioner
was not afforded a proper hearing because one of the Commissioners considered factors outside
the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy”).
The PBA home page includes a tab titled: “Cop Killers” that links to a page announcing:
“Keep Cop-Killers in Jail for Life.”4 Any user may then “CLICK HERE to send letters to the
Parole Board,” or click, “Keep Cop-Killers Behind Bars Forever,”5 which links to a list of officers.
Clicking on any officer or checking the box titled, “Send a letter for all cop killers,” links to a

2

NYCPBA, https://www.nycpba.org/community/keep-cop-killers-in-jail/ (last visited February 5, 2020).
See Clark v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531 (1st Dep’t 2018); Matter of Applewhite v. New York
State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380 (3d Dep’t 2018). In Applewhite, a divided panel held that the Board may
consider “community opposition.” Without offering a legal rational, the First Department reached the same conclusion
in Clark. The Applewhite majority decision was based, in part, on incomplete legislative history and a faulty premise:
that 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8005(2), a regulation promulgated in 1978 to express the Board’s unwritten policy regarding
“community opposition,” somehow established the “clear intent” of the legislature to authorize consideration of such
material. As the dissenting justices correctly observed, the clearest indication of legislative intent are the words of a
statute. Applewhite, 167 A.D.3d 1385. And Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) clearly does not include “community
opposition” as one of the factors that may be considered by the Board. Accordingly, the Board’s March 20, 2019
determination should be reversed because “community opposition” is not a factor that the Board should consider or
rely upon.
4
NYCPBA, https://www.nycpba.org/ (last visited February 5, 2020).
5
This link includes the statement that: “Working together, we can keep cop-killers right where they should be…
behind bars. Click the button, below, to send your opinion on an individual killer — or all — to the Parole Board.”
3
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window that provides the “Perp” name. To submit a pre-written one sentence form to the Board,
only name and zip code need be provided.6 There appears to be no limit to the number of
submissions the same entity can generate and any zip code can be input, including a fake zip code.
Ex. 7, Rayner Affirmation and PBA Test Letter Submissions.7 Each generated form letter states:
“I vehemently oppose parole for

killer of P.O.

generated form letters are identical to those in Mr.

on 8/2/1979.”8 These

parole file. See Exs. 5 and 7.

The second category of “community opposition” included approximately 2,000 copies of
10 template letters espousing the same penal philosophy: that taking the life of Officer
“should preclude [Mr.

from ever being paroled.” See, e.g., Ex. 5 at 2-11.9 The third

category of “community opposition” included approximately 350 miscellaneous letters, espousing
largely the same penal philosophy: that someone who kills a police officer should never be allowed
parole. See, e.g., Ex. 5, at 17, 20,22 and 24.10
These three categories of opposition material conveyed penal philosophy—the belief that
anyone who has killed a police officer should never be released. This is precisely the sort of
consideration and guidance that the Court of Appeals has found to be “outside the scope of the
applicable statute.” King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994) (“There is
evidence in the record that petitioner was not afforded a proper hearing because one of the

6

NYCPBA, https://www nycpba.org/community/keep-cop-killers-in-jail/cop-killers-form/?id=25886 (last visited
February 5, 2020).
7
Undersigned counsel used the PBA website to make five separate submissions over the course of three days. All
submissions were accepted despite inputting “test” as first and last name in all submissions, inputting 00000 as a zip
code in one submission and 84101, which is Salt Lake City Utah, in another, and submitting three identical
submissions on three successive days. Residents of other states should not be considered members of the relevant
“community” for the purpose of determining whether a person should be released to parole supervision in New York
State. Ex. 7.
8
There is an option to add “remarks,” but DOCCS represented that all letters were identical to the one sample DOCCS
disclosed, which did not include more than the stock sentence. See Exs. 5 and 6.
9
All 10 template letters are included at Ex. 5 at 2-11. Per DOCCS, the number in the upper left-hand corner of each
letter designates the approximate number of identical letters received. See Ex. 21.
10
Of the approximately 350 miscellaneous letters, select examples are included in Ex. 5 at 11-26.
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Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal
philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life
imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are not in place.”).
The Court of Appeals deemed it inappropriate for a commissioner to be guided by his personal
beliefs that killing a police officer deserved the death penalty or life without parole. Similarly,
thousands of form letters generated from the PBA calling for life without parole is not a “relevant
guideline” to be considered by the Board. Id. (“[The Board] must provide the inmate with a proper
hearing in which only the relevant guidelines are considered.”)
The opposition material relied on and cited in the Board’s decision told the Board to
automatically deny parole to Mr.

because he killed a police officer. That viewpoint should

have been disregarded by the Board, but instead it was considered, relied on, and cited during both
the interview11 and in the Board’s decision. See Ex. 1 at 39:21-23 (noting “community opposition
to your release”); King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 434 (1st Dep’t,
1993), aff'd, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“For the Board to simply decide that any case which involves
the death of a police officer, regardless of all of the other circumstances surrounding the crime,
automatically necessitates the denial of parole is a breach of the obligation legislatively imposed
upon it to render a qualitative judgment based upon a review of all the relevant factors.”).
The “opposition material” urging life without parole was a central determinant in the
Board’s decision. There was no opposition from the current Brooklyn District Attorney and no
opposition from either sentencing judge. Although Mr.

is not sentenced to life without parole,

11
Commissioner Davis made his reliance on this penal philosophy clear during the interview, stating: “I just find it
interesting that the police officer, although he was off duty, you shot and killed this individual who was charged with
protecting that same community that you were terrorizing. He was assigned to the th Precinct. He was the person
in New York City protecting that community that you covered [sic] with an illegal firearm, yet he was shot and killed
protecting that community. . . . You’ve taken a police officer who provides safety and security to the community, and
he’s now removed.” Ex. 1 at 30:17-24 and 37:23.
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the Board allowed opposition material that endorsed life without parole to enter its decisionmaking. King at 432 (“Since neither the death penalty nor life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole are part of the law of this State, they should clearly not have entered into the Board's
consideration.”).
Consideration and reliance on this kind of opposition material is also inappropriate because
approximately 90% of the letters indicated only the organizing abilities and resources of a single
organization—in this case a police union—the PBA. That Mr.

does not have the resources

to organize an on-line campaign to solicit letters of support does not mean that an equal, or greater,
number of members of society would not support his release.

Reliance on this sort of

“opposition”—or this kind of support—would reduce the Board to counting votes, which is not its
mandate. Such “opposition” is beyond the statutory factors delineated in Executive Law § 259-i
and the Board’s consideration and reliance of this material requires reversal.
B.

The Board Also Improperly Relied on Erroneous Information Contained in
the “Community Opposition”

Both the template letters and the miscellaneous letters repeatedly urge the Board to deny
parole on the basis of two inaccurate facts: first, that Mr.
killing of Officer

was convicted for the intentional

something that two separate juries considered, but neither convicted

him of— and second, that Mr.

still poses a danger to society. See e.g. Ex. 5 at 2-6, 8-17.

Police Commissioners over the years repeatedly wrote the same letter objecting to parole,
erroneously stating that Mr.

was convicted of “first-degree murder in the slaying of Officer

and claiming, without evidence, that Mr.

“would pose a significant risk to both the

general public and law enforcement personnel.” Id. at 12-16. The Detectives’ Endowment
Association asserts that Mr.

is a “dangerous thug.” Id. at 17.
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Mr.

was convicted of manslaughter for Officer

life sentence for his murder. Further, as indicated by Mr.

death and is not serving a
disciplinary history, institutional

adjustment, and COMPAS scores, he presents the lowest possible risk to society on every measure
that COMPAS assesses. Accordingly, the Board’s decision based on this “community opposition”
amounts to reliance on erroneous information, and should be annulled. See Plevy v. Travis, 17
A.D.3d 879 (3d Dep’t 2005) (holding that denial of parole based in part on a prior violation of
probation which was dismissed constituted reliance on erroneous information and required a de
novo interview); Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800 (3d Dep’t 2004) (ordering de novo interview
because the Board erroneously referred to petitioner’s conviction as first degree murder, when the
crime of conviction was second degree murder).
C.

The Board Improperly Considered Inflammatory Rhetoric Contained in the
“Community Opposition”

The miscellaneous letters that the Board relied on describe Mr.

as an “animal,” a

“beast,” and assert that he “should already have been executed,” “in a perfect world he would
have been executed years ago,” that “[t]he only fair justice would have been execution,” and that
he needs to “burn in hell.” Ex. 5 at 20, 23, 24, 25, 26.
This is not the situation in which the Board can be presumed to have ignored the improper
matter contained within these submissions.

Here, the opposition material conveyed penal

philosophy, inaccurate information and inflammatory rhetoric and the Board’s citation to
“community opposition” in denying parole establishes that the Board considered, relied upon, and
was influenced by it. Cf. Duffy v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 132 A.D.3d
1207, 1209 (3d Dep’t 2015) (noting that even though inappropriate matters may have been
included in victim submissions, there was “nothing in the Board's decision indicating that it was
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influenced by, placed weight upon, or relied upon any improper matter, whether in the victim's
family statements or otherwise.”). The opposition material in Mr.

file is filled with penal

philosophy, highly inflammatory, and therefore beyond the statutory factors and guidance
delineated in Executive Law § 259-i.
V.

In Denying Parole, The Board Relied On An Outdated Claim That The Kings County
District Attorney Opposed Release
In denying parole, the Board claimed that the Kings County District Attorney opposed

release.

Ex. 1 at 39:21-22. But, the parole file only contained a letter submitted by a former
was first eligible for parole.12 Ex. 2, February

Brooklyn assistant district attorney when Mr.

3, 2011 Letter from ADA Kenneth Taub. There has been no opposition from the Brooklyn District
Attorney during Mr.
A.

subsequent four parole interviews.

The Current Kings County District Attorney Did Not Oppose Release

There was no opposition to release from the current, duly elected Brooklyn District
Attorney. The 2011 letter was submitted by a former assistant district attorney in a prior
administration. Since each parole review is a “new opportunity”13 and “fresh” review,14 a letter
that is more than 8 years old and does not reflect the recommendation of the current District
Attorney—nor anyone in his administration—does not constitute a district attorney
recommendation within the meaning of Executive Law § 259-i. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-

12

The letter was signed by ADA Kenneth Taub, who has not been a Brooklyn Assistant District Attorney for several
years. See Acting Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez Announces Promotions to Key Leadership Positions,
BROOKLYN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (Feb. 3, 2017), http://brooklynda.org/2017/02/03/acting-brooklyn-districtattorney-eric-gonzalez-announces-promotions-to-key-leadership-positions/.
13
See Ex. 1 at 2 in which one commissioner stated: “Today is a new day and new opportunity for you. We’re not
bound by any prior decisions of the Board.”
14
See Ex. 3, Excerpts from 2017 and 2013 Parole Interview Transcripts at 2:22-3:10 (explaining that each parole
review requires the commissioners to “deliberate fresh.”).
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i(2)(c)(A)(vii). It also does not reflect the views of the public official the people of Kings County
have chosen to represent them.
The Board’s reliance on a stale, outdated assistant district attorney letter was improper.
The Board would not rely on an outdated disciplinary record or COMPAS report or an eight-yearold letter confirming re-entry plans—such information would no longer be relevant on the question
of whether parole at this time should be granted. Similarly, the assistant district attorney letter
relied on did not reflect a current recommendation from the current District Attorney. See Hopps
v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, No. 2553/18 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cty. 2018) (granting de novo interview
after finding that the Board, in denying parole based on “official opposition” written years before
the interview, had acted with “irrationality bordering on impropriety”). See Matter of Rossakis v.
New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 26 (1st Dep’t 2016) (“It is not the role of the parole
board to resentence the petitioner according to the personal opinions of its members as to the
appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant
statutory factors, he should be released. . . . Likewise, the Board cannot unduly focus on the nature
of the crime, for it is but one factor; the board must assess the applicant as [he] is today and how
he has prepared [himself] for release back into society.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the 2011 assistant district attorney letter did not oppose release in 2019. Rather,
the letter recommended that Mr.

not be paroled at the “first possible opportunity” nor in the

“foreseeable future,” but it did not oppose parole forever. Ex. 2 at 2. The 2011 letter does not
convey opposition to release after 8 more years of incarceration.
B.

The Board Failed To Request An Updated Recommendation From The Kings
County District Attorney

The Board failed to request and thus consider a recommendation from the current Kings
County District Attorney. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii) (requiring the Board to
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consider the “recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the
inmate…” ) and Hopps v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, No. 2553/18 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cty. 2018)
(granting de novo interview after finding that the Board, in denying parole based on “official
opposition” written years before the interview, had acted with “irrationality bordering on
impropriety”).
Instead, the Board relied on a letter that was submitted by a former Brooklyn assistant
district attorney two administrations and more than 8 years ago, when Mr.

was first eligible

for parole. See Ex. 2. The Board has not requested an updated letter since 2007. See Ex. 4, June
19, 2007 Letters from James Cassel, at 2 (requesting official “statement and/or recommendation
from District Attorney); see also Ex. 3 at 21:25-22:8 (“Letters were sent out . . . in 2007, by, then,
the Division of Parole, and we got one response back. . . . All we have is this letter from 2011,
from the Kings County DA’s office.”).15 This was apparently inconsistent with the Parole Board’s
customary practice of soliciting letters from the Brooklyn District Attorney throughout the year.
See,

April

3,

2019

Letter

from

Eric

Gonzalez

to

Anthony

Annucci,

https://www.themarshallproject.org/documents/5926343-Eric-Gonzalez-letter-to-AnthonyAnnucci (noting that “[a]lthough customarily parole letters are sent to this Office [by the Board]
on a rolling basis throughout the year, we are requesting an advance list of all inmates sentenced
out of Kings County who are scheduled to appear before the Parole Board.”).
The only request for a recommendation from the District Attorney was made over a decade
ago and addressed to Charles Hynes, who lost both the 2013 Democratic primary and general

15

Additionally, the portions of the parole file were received following the May 1, 2019 request pursuant to 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5 included only four requests for official statements—to the District Attorney, defense attorney,
and both sentencing judges—all made in 2007. If there were subsequent requests, these should also have been
provided pursuant to DOCCS’ June 3, 2019 Directive No. 2014, which requires that all “records available to, or
considered by, the Board of Parole” for “a scheduled appearance before the Board” be made available to an
incarcerated person prior to the perfection of their administrative appeal.
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elections.16 That year, Mr.

community instead elected Kenneth Thompson as Brooklyn’s

District Attorney. Following District Attorney Thompson’s passing, Governor Cuomo appointed
Eric Gonzalez to serve the remainder of his term. Less than a year later, in November 2017,
Brooklyn voters elected Gonzalez as Brooklyn’s District Attorney.17 The Board’s failure to
request and consider updated recommendations from either District Attorney during Mr.
2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 parole reviews deprived Mr.

of the recommendation from the

current, duly-elected District Attorney. This is especially prejudicial in light of District Attorney
Gonzalez’s Justice 2020 Initiative, which he announced in January 2018.18 Since that time—and
prior to Mr.

March 2019 parole interview—District Attorney Gonzalez committed his

Office to implementing seventeen action items, including to “[c]onsider recommending parole
when the minimum sentence is complete and participate more robustly in parole proceedings.”19
And, District Attorney Gonzalez has singled out those serving life sentences who committed their
crimes at age 23 or younger for special consideration.20 Yet the Board failed to request the
recommendation of his Office.
VI.

The Board Did Not Identify An Aggravating Factor That Would Permit Denial Based
Solely On The Crime.
The loss of two lives is not to be minimized, but the incident that led to Mr.

does not establish aggravating circumstances. There was no evil intent or plan. Mr.

crimes
was an

adolescent who, as he states, out of stupidity and ignorance obtained an illegal gun for self-defense.

16

See https://www nytimes.com/2019/01/30/obituaries/charles-j-hynes-dies.html
Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez, BROOKLYN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, http://www.brooklynda.org/eric-gonzalez/.
18
DA Eric Gonzalez Announces Justice 2020 Initiative, BROOKLYN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (Jan. 24, 2018),
http://www.brooklynda.org/2018/01/24/da-eric-gonzalez-announces-justice-2020-initiative/.
19
Justice 2020 Action Plan, BROOKLYN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (Mar. 11, 2019),
http://www.brooklynda.org/justice2020/.
20
Post-Conviction Justice Bureau, BROOKLYN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, http://www.brooklynda.org/postconviction-justice-bureau/ (“For cases in which juveniles (defined as age 23 or younger at the time of the offense)
were sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence, special considerations must go into their parole determinations so
that there can be a meaningful inquiry into whether they have matured into appropriate candidates for release.”).
17
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On his way home from a civil service exam—he aspired to a job with the Post Office maintaining
vehicles—he encountered what he perceived to be a dangerous situation and used the gun. His
conduct was not justified legally or morally—that is why he was convicted and sentenced to a
multi-decade sentence, and why he has spent more than 40 of his 59 years in prison—but Mr.
young age, lack of any prior criminal record, and his serious, unexplained injuries after he
was apprehended by the police establish mitigation. The aggravating circumstance cited by the
Board is the nature of the victim, Officer

But Mr.

was not convicted of murdering

Officer
VII.

The Board Relied on Two Unproven Factual Findings In Violation Of Mr.
Sixth Amendment Right To A Trial By Jury
The Board has extended the length of Mr.

minimum and maximum sentence based

on two separate factual findings not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Each finding is a
violation of Mr.

Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. See United States v. Haymond,

139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019).
First, the Board relied on an assistant district attorney letter that asserted a fact not found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The letter asserted that Mr.
police officer in an attempt to avoid arrest.” Mr.
interview that he never knew Officer

“used that weapon to kill a

stated during the March 2019 parole

was a police officer trying to arrest him. Ex. 8, pg.

14:9-19. Second, the letter also inferred that Mr.

intentionally killed Officer

but Mr.

was acquitted of intentional murder. Two juries considered the question and neither jury
convicted.
In addition, a juvenile life sentence without a meaningful opportunity to obtain release
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

The

maximum sentence allowable for juvenile offenders who are not irreparably corrupt is one that
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provides a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). As an adolescent offender,21
is entitled to a meaningful opportunity for parole upon demonstration of maturity and
rehabilitation. Id. This establishes a liberty interest in parole. By repeatedly denying parole,
claiming release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the
seriousness of the offense so as to undermine respect for the law, the Board is not providing a
meaningful opportunity for parole. Instead, the Board is increasing the minimum sentence
imposed based on a finding that Mr.

has not served sufficient time for his crimes and is

deserving of more punishment. This sentence enhancement violates Mr.

Sixth and Eighth

Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Mr.
Mr.

petitions this Court to order Respondents to release

to parole supervision. In the alternative, Mr.

petitions this Court to annul the March

2019 parole denial and order a properly conducted de novo parole interview before a new panel
that does not include Commissioners Berliner and Davis, nor any other commissioner who has
previously denied parole.

21

Since the attendant circumstances of youth extend beyond age 17 and
was just 18, Miller et al. should
be equally applicable. See, e.g., Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787 (JCH), 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn.
Mar. 29, 2018) (holding that Miller applies to 18-year-olds and thus that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole” for offenders who were 18 years old at the time of
their
crimes);
Post-Conviction
Justice
Bureau,
BROOKLYN
DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, http://www.brooklynda.org/post-conviction-justice-bureau/ (stating Brooklyn District Attorney’s policy
regarding parole recommendations: “For cases in which juveniles (defined as age 23 or younger at the time of the
offense) were sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence, special considerations must go into their parole
determinations so that there can be a meaningful inquiry into whether they have matured into appropriate candidates
for release.”).
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